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alphabethically. Evidence on (the lack of) aUdit-quality differentiation in the 
private client segment of the Belgian audit market 
ABSTRACT 
This  paper contributes  to  the  empirical  audit-quality  literature and provides 
evidence  on  (the  lack  of)  audit-quality  differentiation  in  the  private  client 
segment  of the  Belgian  audit  market.  Auditor  size  is  used  as  audit-quality 
proxy.  Prior evidence on  audit-quality differentiation between big  Sand non-
big  S auditors  in  the  private  client  segment  of  the  Belgian  audit  market  is 
mixed.  In this paper we investigate whether these mixed results stem from the 
inability  of the  dichotomous  BigS/non-BigS  variable  to capture  auditor-size 
differences  in  a  less  concentrated  audit  market.  To  that  end  we  examine 
whether  alternative  continuous  measures  of  audit-firm  size  (i.e.  auditor 
market  share,  number  of  audit-firm  clients,  number  of partners  in  the  audit 
firm,  total  assets  and  operating profit of the  audit firm)  have  a constraining 
impact on  earnings management in  a large sample of privately held Belgian 
companies  (n  = 1302). Overall, we do not find evidence that is supportive of 
quality  differentiation  in  the  private  client  segment  of  the  Belgian  audit 
market. 
2 1. Introduction 
DeAngelo (1981)  argues that audit quality can  be  proxied by audit-firm size. 
Her  argument  can  be  summarized  as  follows.  Auditors  suffer  reputational 
damage  if supply of  below-standard  audit services is  revealed.  As  this may 
lead to the loss of clients and/or reduced future audit fees, auditors will want 
to  avoid  bad  publicity regarding  their services. The larger an  audit firm,  the 
more  it  has  at  stake  when  its  reputation  is  impaired.  Consequently  larger 
audit firms have a greater incentive to maintain a certain level of audit quality 
as  compared  to  smaller  audit  firms.  Following  this  size  argument,  prior 
studies have used the dichotomous Big6 (now Big41)  /  non-Big6 variable as a 
proxy for audit-firm size and thus audit quality, and  as such provide evidence 
of  product  differentiation  in  various  national  audit markets.  Where  such  an 
approach  may  be  appropriate  in  environments  where  audit  supply 
concentration is huge,  it may be inappropriate in  less concentrated markets. 
In this paper, we test alternative continuous auditor size variables as proxies 
for  audit  quality  instead  of  focusing  on  the  dichotomous  big6/non-big  6 
variable.  We  adopt  this  research  design  to  test  whether  there  is  quality-
differentiation in the private client segment of the Belgian audit market where 
audit  supply  concentration  is  far  less  pronounced  than  in  Anglo-American 
economies. As listed companies are far less dominant (both in number and in 
size)  in various continental European economies, further investigation of the 
audit-quality  issue  in  the  private  client  segment  of  the  audit  market  is 
warranted. 
3 Most  Anglo-American  studies  of  audit-quality  differentiation  were 
performed on  samples of publicly held  companies, and  indeed  report quality 
differences  between  Big  6 and  non-Big  6  firms.  For  example,  Big  6  firms 
charge higher fees (see for example, Simunic 1980; Francis and Simon  1987; 
Craswell et al.  1995), are  more  likely to  issue non-clean audit opinions (see 
for example,  Mutchler et al.  1996) and  constrain earnings management more 
than  non-big  6  firms  (Francis  et  al.  1999,  Becker  et  al.  1998).  However, 
evidence of  audit-quality differentiation between  Big6  and  non-Big6  auditors 
on  samples  of  privately  held  Belgian  firm  data  is  mixed.  First,  as  to  audit 
pricing,  Willekens and  Achmadi  (2002)  report fee  premia for  Big  6 auditors. 
This could  point in  the  direction  of  quality differences. They further report a 
significant decrease of these premia during the 1990s. Second, Gaeremynck 
and  Willekens (2002)  find  that there  are  no differences as to audit reporting 
between  big  6 and  non-big  6 audit firms  when  problems  in  client  firms  are 
very obvious, but do find  more  stringent reporting by big 6 auditors when the 
problems  in  client firms  are  more  subtle.  Finally, the  evidence from  Belgian 
earnings  management  studies  is  little  supportive  of  quality  differences 
between big  6 and  non-Big 6 firms. Based on  a sample of individual financial 
statements2  issued by privately held Belgian firms,  Sercu, Vander Bauwhede 
and  Willekens  (2002)  do  not  find  that  Big  6  auditors  constrain  earnings 
management  more  than  non-Big  6  auditors.  Based  on  a  sample  of 
1 We continue to use the Big6/ non-Big6 terminology throughout this paper because our 
empirical data relate to the time period before the merger between Price Waterhouse and 
Coopers and Lybrand in 1997, and the collapse of Andersen in 2002. 
2  Individual financial statements are typically tax driven in Belgium, as taxes are raised on 
the individual company level, but no separate set of (non-consolidated) financial statements 
are issued for tax purposes. 
4 consolidated  financial  statements3  issued  by  the  largest  private  Belgian 
companies,  VanderBauwhede,  Willekens  and  Gaeremynck  (2001)  find  that 
big  6 auditors constrain income-decreasing earnings management more than 
non-big 6 auditors,  but they do  not find evidence that they constrain income-
increasing earnings management more. 
In  this paper we contribute to the empirical audit-quality literature in  at 
least two  ways.  First,  we  test whether there  is  audit-quality differentiation in 
the  private  client  segment  of  the  Belgian  audit  market.  We  do  not  find 
corroborative  evidence  of  quality  differentiation  based  on  auditor-size 
differences. Second, we  investigate whether the prior mixed results on quality 
differentiation  between  auditors  in  Belgium  stem  from  the  inability  of  the 
dichotomous Big6/non-Big6 variable to  capture auditor-size differences (and 
thus  quality differences,  DeAngelo  1981)  in  the  Belgian  audit  market.  The 
alternative  proxies  for  audit-firm  size  tested  in  this  study  include  audit-firm 
market share, number of clients, number of audit-firm partners, total audit-firm 
assets  and  operating  profit.  Finally  we  also  contribute  to  the  earnings 
management  literature  as  we  use  the  extent  of  discretionary  accruals 
management as the dependent variable in our analyses. 
The  remainder of the paper is organized as  follows.  In the next 
section  we  briefly  discuss  the  Belgian  audit  environment.  We develop  our 
research questions in Section 3, and introduce our empirical model in Section 
4.  In  section 5 we  present our sample  and  data and discuss the descriptive 
3 Consolidated financial statements are supposed not to be tax driven, as it is required by 
Belgian Law to undo accounting choices that are tax driven in individual financial statements 
when the statements are consolidated. 
5 statistics  on  various  audit-firm  size  measures.  We  present  our  results  in 
section 6. We conclude with a summary and discussion. 
2. The Belgian Audit Environment 
The vast majority of Belgian companies are privately held and family-owned. 
Less  than  150  companies  are  listed  relative to  about  a quarter of a million 
Belgian  companies  that  file  financial  statements  with  the  Belgian  National 
Bank.  The  number  of  Belgian  listed  companies  per  one  million  inhabitants 
amounts to  15.5 as  compared to 35.6 in the UK and  30.1  in  the US,  and the 
ratio  of  market  capitalization  to  GOP  is  only  38  percent  in  Belgium  as 
compared to  123 percent in the UK and 82 percent in the US. 
Both  publicly  held  as  well  as  privately  held  companies  that  meet 
certain  legal  form  and  size  criteria are  mandated to  file financial  statements 
with  the  Belgian  National  Bank.  Belgian  companies  only submit one  set  of 
individual accounts  for  both  financial  reporting  and  tax  purposes.  As  taxes 
are  raised  on  the  individual  company  level,  but  no  separate  set  of  (non-
consolidated) financial statements are issued for tax purposes in  Belgium, the 
accounting choices in individual company accounts are typically tax driven. 
External auditing is  mandatory for all large (publicly held and privately 
held)  companies  in  Belgium4•  The  regulator's  motivation  for  such  a 
4 Large companies are companies which meet at least two of the following criteria: Total 
assets> 3,125,000 Euro; Turnover> 6,250,000 Euro,  number of employees> 50. 
Companies with more than 100 employees are always classified as a large company 
irrespective of their total assets or turnover and hence always have to appoint an 
independent auditor. 
6 widespread mandatory audit requirement is protection of a/l stakeholders of a 
company.  Stakeholders  other  than  investors,  such  as  bankers,  suppliers, 
employees  and  tax  authorities,  are  indeed  the  main  users  of  financial 
statements  issued  by  privately  held  Belgian  companies.  As  to  the  audit 
environment, a notable difference with Anglo-Saxon environments is the lack 
of auditor litigation in  Belgium.  In litigious environments the threat of litigation 
works  as  a  deterrent  against  below-standard  audit  quality.  When  such  a 
threat  is  absent the  auditor may feel tempted to keep a friendly relationship 
with his client in order to safeguard the appointment, and thus be tempted not 
to  constrain  earnings  management  and/or  issue  a  qualified  opinion  when 
necessary. 
Big4/6  market  concentration  is  quite  low  in  Belgium  compared  to 
Anglo-Saxon  and  other  European  countries  (see  Willekens  and  Achmadi 
2002,  Weets and  Jegers 1997, Schaen and  Maijoor 1997).  For example,  in 
the public client segment of the Anglo-Saxon audit market Big 4/6 audit firms 
typically have about 90-95% (or more)  of the market share,  whereas  Big 4/6 
audit firms only have about 50% of the market share in Belgium. In the private 
client  segment  of  the  Belgian  audit  market  this  is  even  lower,  namely one 
third (VanderBauwhede and Willekens 2001). 
3. Research Questions 
R01: Is there audit-quality differentiation in the private client segment of  the 
Belgian audit market? 
7 We  follow  DeAngelo's  (1981)  argument  that  audit  quality  can  be 
proxied  by  audit-firm  size.  As  argued  in  the  introduction,  the  underlying 
rationale  is  that  larger  auditors  have  more  to  lose  if  an  audit  failure  is 
detected,  and  therefore  have  incentives  to  supply  higher  audit  quality. 
However, the probability that an audit failure is detected is  much  lower when 
privately  held  Belgian  firms  are  audited.  First,  the  financial  statements  of 
privately held firms  are  not  scrutinized  by investors,  financial  analysts  and 
market  regulators  (such  as  the  Commission  for  Banking  and  Finance  in 
Belgium or the Securities and  Exchange Commission in the US), as they are 
only used and  scrutinized by other stakeholders such  as bankers,  suppliers, 
employees and  tax authorities.  Second,  there is almost  no  litigation  against 
auditors in Belgium. Note that there have only been eight court cases against 
auditors since the foundation of the Belgian Kingdom in  1831  (Aerts 2002). In 
Anglo-Saxon  environments  litigation  is  a mechanism  to enforce compliance 
with  auditing standards and  regulations (see also section 2). However, there 
exist  various  alternative  quality  enforcement  mechanisms,  including  the 
three-year auditor tenure rules,  disciplinary sanctions imposed by the Belgian 
Institute of Auditors after violation of the Ethical code7, directed investigations 
and peer reviews organized by the Belgian Institute of Auditors. 
Note that the lack of incentives to  supply higher quality-services may 
also  stem  from  the  lack  of  demand for  quality-differentiated  audits  in  a 
6  In Belgium, auditors are tenured for periods of three years; this requirement is set to 
promote auditor independence as the opportunity for firms to dismiss their auditor after a 
non-clean audit opinion is reduced. 
8 privately held  firm  context.s  In  a typical  publicly held firm  context,  economic 
demand  for  quality-differentiated  audit  services  is  mainly  attributable  to 
agency  and  information  asymmetry  problems  caused  by  the  separation 
between  ownership  and  control.  However,  those  agency  and  information 
asymmetry  problems  are  less  pronounced  in  a privately  held  firm  context, 
where the owner is  often the  manager.  Given  the  discussion  above,  it is ex 
ante  not  clear  whether  audit-quality  differences  are  to  be  expected  in  the 
private client segment of the Belgian audit market. 
RQ2: Are continuous measures of  audit-firm size better proxies of  audit quality 
in the private client segment of the Belgian audit market, as compared 
to the dichotomous Big61 non-Big6 variable? 
Current Belgian evidence on  audit-quality differentiation in the private 
client segment of the audit market is mixed (see section 1). While this may be 
attributable  to  institutional  characteristics  (as  discussed  in  the  above 
paragraphs),  it may also be that the size proxy used to capture audit-quality 
differences in  prior studies is not suitable in  the context of Belgian  privately 
held audit clients. Indeed, the dichotomous BigS/non-BigS variable used in all 
prior  Belgian  studies  may  not  be  appropriate  as  non-Big6  auditors  are 
important players in the  Belgian  audit market.  Note that the  market share of 
the  Big6  in  the  private  client segment  of the  Belgian  audit  market  is only 
about 37 percent (VanderBauwhede and Willekens 2001), and that non-Big6 
7 During the period 1990-1999 126 disciplinary cases against auditors were initiated relative 
to an average number of certified auditors of 800 in that period. In about 66 percent of those 
cases auditors were indeed sanctioned. 
8 We thank one of the anonymous reviewers for this insight. 
9 auditors are in the top 6 of largest audit firms in Belgium. As a consequence it 
may well be that quality differences between larger and smaller auditors may 
not be  captured  by  using  the  dichotomous  Big6/ non-Big6 variable.  Such  a 
classification  would  put  a large (and  potentially higher-quality) but non-big6 
auditor in the same group as small (and hypothesized lower quality) auditors. 
It  is  therefore appropriate  to  test alternative  continuous  measures  of  audit-
firm  size  as  they  may  be  better  proxies  of  size  and  hence  audit-quality 
differences in the private client segment of the Belgian audit market. 
4. Model Specification and  Variable Measurement 
We  estimated  the  following  multiple  regression  model  (using  OLS)  to 
examine our research questions: 
Where: 
IDACit!  = the absolute value of estimated (cf. Infra) discretionary 
accruals scaled by lagged total assets for firm i in year t; 
AUDITORit  = a measure of audit-firm size of firm i in year t; 
(1) , 
FDEBTTAit  = ratio of total financial debt over total assets for firm i in year t; 
9 We thank one of the anonymous reviewers for this insight. 
10 DFDEBTit  = a dummy variable that takes value 1 if there is an increase in 
financial debt for firm i in year t in the year after the year under 
study, 0 otherwise; 
CDEBTTAit  = ratio of accounts payable over total assets for firm i in year t; 
= extent to which firm i depends on implicit contracts with 
employees, measured by a dummy that takes 1 if firm has more 
than 100 employees and 0 otherwise; 
TAXit  = a dummy variable that indicates whether firm i has tax-loss 
carry-forwards in year t10 or not; 
ABOCFit  = absolute value of cash flow from operations scaled by lagged 
total assets for firm i in year t; 
A measure of earnings management, in  particular a measure of discretionary 
accruals, is the dependent variable in  our model. We chose this variable for 
our study as prior earnings management studies (Francis et al. 1999,  Becker 
et  al.  1998)  have  shown  that  auditor-size  (and  hence  quality)  differences 
indeed affect the level  of discretionary accruals (by listed American firms).  In 
particular, big  6 auditors seem to  constrain earnings management more than 
non-big 6 auditors,  and therefore are deemed to  provide  higher quality. The 
independent variables  in  our model  are then  a proxy for audit-firm size (the 
test variable AUDITORit) and  various proxies for the  incentives for earnings 
management by privately held Belgian companies (the control variables). 
10 Whether a firm actually has tax-loss carry-forwards is not observable. We proxy the 
existence of tax-loss carry-forwards by whether firms paid taxes in the prior year (that is, no 
tax-loss carry-forwards) or not (that is, tax-loss carry-forwards). 
11 4.1  Discretionary accruals 
We  measure  earnings  management  through  discretionary  accruals.  We 
estimated discretionary accruals by  using the discretionary accruals model of 
Sercu, VanderBauwhede and Willekens (2002): 
TACSijt =  ~Ojt+ ~1jtGPPESjt + ~2jt ADJREVSjt +  ~3jt DOCFSijt 
Where: 
TACSijt 
+ ~4jt LAGT  ACSijt  + Ejt  (2) 
=  total  accruals  (computed  as  working  capital  accruals  minus 
depreciation) scaled  by  lagged total  assets for firm  i in  industry j 
and year t; 
GPPESijt  =  gross  property  plant  and  equipment  scaled  by  lagged  total 
assets for firm i in industry j in year t; 
ADJREVSijt =  change  in  revenues  minus  change  in  receivables  scaled  by 
lagged total assets for firm i in industry j in year t; 
DOCFSijt  =  change in  operating cash flow scaled by lagged total assets for 
firm i in  industry j in year t; 
LAGTACSijt = lagged total accruals scaled by lagged total assets for firm i in 
industry j in year t. 
We first obtained industry- and  year-specific regression coefficients by using 
industry- and  year-specific  estimation  portfolios  of  firm-years  that  are  not 
included in our random sample of privately held companies. We then use the 
12 estimated  coefficients  to  derive  non-discretionary  accruals  for  our  random 
sample of companies. Discretionary accruals are then computed by deducting 
estimated  non-discretionary  accruals  from  the  total  accruals  reported  by 
those  companies.  Following  Reynolds  and  Francis  (2001),  we  use  the 
absolute  value  of  discretionary  accruals  as  our  measure  of  the  extent of 
earnings  management,  because  this  measure  allows  us  to  examine  the 
impact  of  audit  quality  on  both  income-increasing  (positive  discretionary 
accruals)  as  well  as  income-decreasing  (negative  discretionary  accruals) 
earnings  management.  Both  types  of  earnings  management  can  be 
detrimental to stakeholders. 
4.2 Test variables 
Table  1  gives  an  overview  of  the  explanatory  variables  in  our  multiple 
regression models. AUDITORIt  is the test variable and we proxy it by various 
measures of audit-firm size (DeAngelo  1981). We first introduce the  popular 
dichotomous Big6/non-Big6 variable (BIG61t), but rather focus on the following 
alternative continuous  measures of audit-firm size, i.e. auditor market share, 
number  of  clients,  number of  partners  in  the  audit firm,  total  assets  of the 
audit  firm,  and  operating  profit  of the  audit  firm.  The  measurement  of  the 
alternative variables of audit-firm size is as follows: 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
13 Auditor market share (SHARElt). Auditor market shares were  based on  the 
percentage of assignments"  of  an  auditor in  our  sample.  We  preferred the 
number  of  assignments  to  alternative  size  measures,  such  as  total  client 
assets or sales, because our measure is based on a random sample of client 
firms. Therefore, any use of a weighted measure of auditor market share (for 
example  market shares based  on  total  client assets or  client sales)  may  be 
biased when the largest clients are not included in our sample. Also using the 
number  of  assignments  is  supported  by  the  fact  that  the  expertise  and 
competence  acquainted during  audits  may  rather depend  on  the  number of 
different  clients  audited,  than  the  size  of  those  clients  (in  terms  of  total 
assets,  or  sales).  Note  also  that  Weets  and  Jegers  (1997)  found  a  high 
Spearman  rank  correlation  between  concentration  ratios  based  on  the 
number  of  clients  on  the  one  hand,  and  based  on  clients'  sales  and  client 
total assets on the other hand. 
Number of clients  (NUMlt).  This  is  the  number  of  all assignments  for the 
auditors in our sample. 
Number of partners (PARTNERSlt). As the number of partners may increase 
in the audit firm's market share, we use it as an alternative measures of audit-
firm size. We counted the number of partners of each audit firm as reported in 
the  Membership List  of the  Belgian  Institute of  Auditors  (I.B.R.) for the year 
1995.  We then  extrapolated these findings  for to  the  years 1994 and  1996, 
II We use "assignments" to refer to the number of statutory audit jobs. 
14 since  we  do  not expect drastic changes  in  the number partners of  an  audit 
firm in adjacent years. 
Total assets (LNTA It)  and total operating profit (LNOPIt). Total assets and 
sales  are  frequently  used  measures  of  firm  size  in  empirical  research.  As 
sales  (audit  fees  received)  are  not  reported  by  most  audit firms  and  clients 
are  not mandated to  report fees  paid to their auditors either, we  used  audit-
firm  operating profit.  Note that we  include the  natura/logarithm of the  audit-
firm  total  assets  and  operating  profit  in  our  model,  as  our  model  was 
otherwise  not  estimable  due  to  linear  dependence  in  the  explanatory 
variables. 
We  estimate  six  different  models,  namely  the  models  A through  F. 
Those models only differ in the proxy for audit-firm size. Should higher-quality 
(larger)  auditors  constrain  the  extent  of  earnings  management  in  client 
financial  statements  more,  as  is  the  case  in  a  public-firmlAnglo-Saxon 
context,  a  significant  negative  coefficient  on  our  various  audit-firm  size 
variables  is  to  be  found  (research  question  1).  If  the  coefficients  on  our 
continuous  measures  of  audit-firm  size  are  more  significant  than  the 
coefficient on  the  dichotomous variable Big6/non-Big6 auditor, our evidence 
supports the second research question. 
4.3 Control variables 
We  also  need  to  control  for  incentives  for  and  additional  constraints  on 
earnings  management.  In  privately held firms,  incentives for and constraints 
15 on  earnings  management mainly  stem  from  their relations with  stakeholders 
other  than  investors,  namely  bankers,  suppliers,  employees  and  tax 
authorities  (VanderBauwhede  and  Willekens  2001)12  Bank  financing  and 
trade  credit  are  important  sources  of  external  financing  for  privately  held 
companies which  have by definition no  access to  public equity financing. We 
therefore include the ratio of financial debt to  total  assets  (FDEBTTA)  and  a 
dummy  for  whether  there  was  an  ex  post  increase  in  debt  financing 
(DFDEBT) as proxies for the extent to which  privately held  Belgian firms  rely 
on  debt  financing.  We  include  the  ratio  of  trade  credit  to  total  assets 
(CDEBTTA)  as  a measure of  a company's  relationship with trade  creditors. 
Further,  Belgian  firms  that  have  more  than  100  employees  are  obliged  to 
submit economic  and  financial  information to  a works  council.  Auditors  are 
required to explain this information to the works council.  In companies with  a 
works  council,  employees  are  important  users  of  the  financial  statements 
(Lefebvre et al.  1995). We therefore include a dichotomous variable (EMPL) 
which  takes  the  value  of  one  (EMPL=1)  if  the  firms  has  more  than  100 
employees (and so  is mandated to install a works council) and zero otherwise 
(EMPL=O).  Note  that we  follow  Sercu  et  al.'s  (2002)  argument that  it  is  an 
empirical  question  whether  relations  with  banks,  trade  creditors  and 
employees  work  as  an  incentive  or  rather  as  a  constraint  on  earnings 
management. 
12 Results of the Vander Bauwhede and Willekens (2001) show that tax is only one of the 
incentives for earnings management in individual financial statements by privately held firms, 
in addition to incentives provided by other stakeholders such as external financiers. We do 
not expect an impact of tax incentives on earnings management in consolidated financial 
statements since Belgian consolidation law requires that any tax-induced accounting choice 
in individual financial statements be reversed in consolidated financial statements. 
16 Also,  in  Belgium  the  reported  earnings  in  individual  financial 
statements  are  used  for  tax  assessment.  Hence,  privately  held  Belgian 
companies  have  strong  incentives  to  manage  the  earnings  number  in 
individual financial statements for tax reasons. We proxy a firm's  incentive to 
manage  earnings  in  individual  financial  statements  for  tax  reasons  by 
whether  a  firm  has  tax-loss  carry-forwards  or  not.  Since  it  is  not  publicly 
observable whether a firm  has tax-loss carry-forwards or not,  we  proxied the 
existence of such tax-loss carry-forwards by whether a firm  paid taxes  in the 
prior year (no tax-loss carry-forwards - TAX=1) or not (tax-loss carry-forwards 
- TAX=O).  Finally, we include the absolute value of cash flow from operations 
to  control  for  potential  misspecification  that  may  occur  in  tests  of earnings 
management  for  firms  with  extreme  financial  performance  (Dechow  et  al. 
1995). 
5. Sample and Descriptive Statistics 
We used  the random  sample  (n  =  1302)  of  privately held  Belgian  industrial 
and  commercial  companies  as  described  in  Sercu,  VanderBauwhede  and 
Willekens  (2002).  We  collected  additional  data  on  the  size  of  the  146 
different audit firms that  audited the client companies  in  this sample. These 
data came  from  1)  the  Membership  List  of  the  Belgian  Institute of Auditors 
(number  of  partners),  2)  the  audit  firms'  financial  statements  which  are 
available from the Belfirst CD-Rom13 (total assets and operating profit), and 3) 
the CD-Rom of the National Bank of Belgium14 (total number of clients). 
13 The Belfirst is a CD-Rom issued by Bureau van Dijck and contains the financial statements 
of all (privately held and publicly held) Belgian and Luxembourg companies that have to 
17 Table 2,  panel  A presents the  descriptive statistics of our continuous 
measures of audit-firm size and  shows that our sample firm years are audited 
by 146 different auditors. Since the number of client firms in our sample is not 
constant across sample years,  the  number of audit firms differs across years 
too.  All  Big6  audit  firms  are  included  in  1994,  1995  and  1996 and  thus the 
difference  in  the  number  of  auditors  across  sample  years  is  due  to 
differences in the number of non-Big6 auditors. This leads to  higher ratios of 
non-Big6  auditors  in  years  with  more  audit firms.  In  addition,  the  audit-firm 
characteristics  are  highly  skewed,  with  greater  values  for  the  Big6.  A 
consequence  is  that  the  mean  and  median  values  of  our  audit-firm 
characteristics are smaller in years with more auditors in our sample. 
We further observe from  Table 2,  panel  A that over 95 percent of the 
audit firms have market shares of  less than  1 percent. The largest audit firm 
has  a market share  of about  10  percent. Thus,  no  single  auditor seems  to 
dominate  the  Belgian  audit  market.  The  number  of  clients  per  audit  firm 
ranges  from  1 to  1263,  1307  and  957  for  the  years  1994,  1995  and  1996 
respectivel/5•  The  median  number  of  partners  per  audit  firm  is  1,  and  95 
submit their financial statements with the National Bank. The financial statements are subject 
to various arithmetical and logical controls. 
14 The CD-Rom issued by the National Bank is similar to the Belfirst CD-Rom. In contrast to 
the Belfirst CD-Rom, it also contains information on the number of clients of audit firms over 
the years 1  994-1996. 
15  Data based on all firms that submitted financial statements with the Belgian National Bank. 
Note that the number of mandates per auditors is generally lower for 1996. This is likely due 
to the fact that not all firms already submitted their financial statements with the National 
Bank at the date the 1996 CD-Rom was made. The figures give though an indication of the 
ranking of the major audit firms, under the assumption that the firms that submit their 
financial statements later than the the moment at which the CD-Rom was made, are 
randomly distributed across audit firms. 
18 percent of the audit firms have less than three partners. One audit firm has as 
much as  49  partners.  The total  assets  of the  audit firms  range  from  1.3, 1.8 
and  1.7 million BEF to  0.9, 0.8 and  0.9 billion  BEF for the years 1994, 1995 
and  1996  respectively.  The  audit  firms'  operating  income  range  from 
operating  losses of 0.9,  1.9 and  2.5  million  BEF  to  operating  profits of  0.2; 
0.16 and 0.13 billion BEF for the years 1994, 1995 and  1996 respectively. 
Table  3  shows  that  our  measures  of  audit  firm  size  are  highly  and 
significantly  correlated.  Pearson  correlation  coefficients  range  from  0.54  to 
0.96 with p-values smaller than 0.0001. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
Tables 4 - 8 give a ranking of the audit firms  in  our sample based on  each  of 
the alternative continuous measures  of audit-firm size.  Five of the six tables 
(Tables 4,  5,  6,  8)  indicate that a non-Big6 auditor(s) enters the Top6 of the 
largest audit firms.  Only the ranking  on  audit firm  total  assets  (see  Table 7) 
identifies  the  Big6  as  the  largest  six  auditors  in  Belgium.  Our  evidence  is 
generally supportive of our concern that Big6 auditors are not necessarily the 
largest audit firms in the Belgian audit market16. 
16  Our data cover the years 1994 - 1996. The ranking of the largest audit firms has changed 
since, due to the merger of Price Waterhouse and Coopers and Lybrand in 1997. Our Tables 
4-8 show that before the merger of Price Waterhouse and Coopers and Lybrand, Price 
Waterhouse was typically one of the smallest Big6 audit firms in Belgium. Now, 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers is the largest audit firm in the Belgian audit market. 
19 [Insert Table 4 about here] 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
6. Empirical Results 
Audit Quality 
Table 9 reports the results of the  OLS estimation of our regression  model  of 
the absolute value of discretionary accruals on  a proxy for  audit quality and 
various control variables. The F-value and adjusted R-squared of the Models 
A  - F indicate  that  the  models  are  successful  in  explaining  (some  of)  the 
variance in  discretionary accruals.  Further, the correlation  matrix (see Table 
10)  and  the  variance  inflation  factors  (not  reported)  do  not  indicate 
multicollinearity problems. 
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
[Insert Table 10 about here] 
20 Table  9,  Model  A  shows  that  the  extent  of  earnings  management  is  not 
smaller for clients audited  by Big6  auditors than  for clients  audited  by  non-
Big6  auditors.  Nor  do  we  find  that  the  extent  of  earnings  management 
decreases in  any of our continuous measures of  audit-firm size (see  Models 
B-F).  We find  thus  no  evidence  supportive  of  a  relationship  between  the 
quality  of  the  external  auditor  and  the  extent  of  discretionary  accruals 
management. The coefficients on  the continuous measures of audit-firm size 
variables  are  not  more  significant than  the coefficient  on  the  dichotomous 
variable Big6/ non-Big6 auditor. There is thus no  evidence supportive of our 
argument that the  use  of continuous  measures of  audit-firm size  (instead  of 
the dichotomous variable Big6/ non-Big6 auditor) increases the power of tests 
of quality differentiation between auditors. 
As  discussed  in  section  3,  lack of evidence of audit-quality differentiation  in 
the private client segment of the Belgian audit market may be a consequence 
of  the  lack  of  demand  for  quality-differentiated  services  or  the  lower 
probability of detection of an  audit failure in privately held Belgian companies. 
The  lower probability of detection of  an  audit failure  may  be  caused  by  the 
relative  absence  of  litigation  in  the  Belgian  audit  environment  or  by  the 
absence  of  scrutiny of  privately held  firm's  financial  statements by  financial 
analysts, investors, and  market regulators. Another potential explanation was 
the inappropriateness of the use of the dichotomous measure Big6/ non-Big6 
auditor as a size proxy in the Belgian audit market. However, since we do not 
find  evidence  supportive  of  continuous  measures  of  audit-firm  size  being 
better  proxies  to  capture  quality  differences  between  auditors,  the  former 
21 explanations seem the more plausible ones. Our results thus suggest that the 
existing  enforcement  and  monitoring  mechanisms  do  not  induce  quality 
differences between auditors in the private client segment of the Belgian audit 
market. 
Control variables 
Signs on the coefficients of FDEBTTA, DFDEBT and CDEBTTA are negative, 
which suggests that monitoring by bankers and  suppliers constrains the level 
to which  privately held companies manage earnings. The coefficient on TAX 
is negative and significant, and is mainly driven by significantly lower levels of 
income-increasing  earnings  management.  This  result  is  in  line  with  Sercu, 
VanderBauwhede  and  Willekens  (2002)  and  is  consistent  with  companies 
reducing  earnings for tax reasons.  The  coefficient on  ABOCF  is  significant 
and  positive, which  is  consistent with the observation that extreme  levels of 
cash flow are  related to  extreme  levels of discretionary accruals (Dechow et 
al. 1995). 
22 Sensitivity checks 
We checked the sensitivity of our results to alternative measures of earnings 
management as well as  of audit-firm size.  First, we checked the sensitivity of 
the results to  our choice of earnings management measure in equation 1. For 
that purpose, we reran the model in equation 1 in two different ways. First, we 
used  an  alternative  specification  of  discretionary  accruals  as  dependent 
variable,  namely  the  widely-adopted  modified  Jones  model  (Dechow et  al. 
1995). Second, we  used total accruals as the dependent variable. Results  of 
both  regressions  show  that  the  audit-firm  size  proxies  are  not  significant, 
which is consistent with the results reported in Table 9. 
Next,  we  checked  the  sensitivity  of  the  results  to  the  use  of  the 
absolute  value  of  discretionary  accruals  as  a  measure  of  earnings 
management.  By  using  the  absolute  value  of  discretionary accruals as  our 
measure of earnings management, we implicitly examine the impact of auditor 
size  (as  a  proxy  for  audit  quality)  on  both  income-increasing  earnings 
management (positive discretionary accruals)  as  well  as  income-decreasing 
earnings management (negative discretionary accruals). To  make this issue 
more  explicit,  we  reran  our regressions  on  the  sub-samples of positive and 
negative discretionary accruals.  Results of these analyses (not reported) are 
consistent with those reported in the body of the text. 
Third,  we  tried  to  increase the  power  of  our tests  by  increasing the 
size-difference  of  auditors  in  our  sample.  We  therefore  ranked  the 
observations on each of the five continuous audit-firm size proxies, and each 
23 time  deleted  the  middle  50  percent  of  observations.  We  also  created  a 
dummy variable that  indicates whether an  observation belongs to the first or 
fourth  quartile.  Observations  in  the  first  quartile  are  audited  by  the  largest 
auditors in our sample.  Observations in the fourth quartile are audited by the 
smallest auditors in our sample. We then replaced our audit-firm size proxy in 
equation  1  by  one  of  those  dummy-variables.  The  results  of  those 
regressions  on  the  reduced  samples  indicate  that  the  dummy  variable  is 
never significant, which corroborates the results reported earlier. 
7. Conclusion 
In  this  paper  we  provide  more  evidence  on  the  lack  of  audit-quality 
differentiation  in  the  private client  segment of  the  Belgian  audit market  and 
use  auditor size  as  our  audit-quality  proxy.  Prior  evidence  on  audit-quality 
differentiation  in  the  private  client  segment  of  the  Belgian  audit  market  is 
mixed,  but  uses  the  big  6/non-big  6 variable  as  auditor-size  proxy.  In  this 
paper we  investigate whether these  mixed  results  stem  from the  inability of 
this  dichotomous  variable  to  capture  auditor-size  differences  in  a  less 
concentrated  audit  market.  Therefore,  we  test various continuous measures 
of  audit-firm size,  namely audit-firm market share, number of clients, number 
of  partners  of  the  audit firm,  audit-firm total  assets  and  audit-firm operating 
profit. We argue that the lack of quality differences between auditors may be 
the  result of a lack of  demand for quality-differentiated services by  privately 
held  Belgian  companies  or  may  be  the  result  of  the  low  probability  of 
detection  of  an  audit  failure  in  those  firms.  Note  that  our results  do  not 
necessarily imply that the existing structures in  Belgium are unable to impose 
24 a  socially  acceptable  level  of  audit  quality.  Our  results  only  suggest  that 
smaller  and  larger  auditors  do  not  differ systematically  as  to  constraining 
discretionary accruals management in privately held companies. Both smaller 
and  larger  auditors  may  still  provide  socially  acceptable  levels  of  audit 
quality,  for  example  the  minimum  level  of  audit  quality  that  results  from 
performing an  audit according to the  Generally Accepted Auditing Standards 
(GAAS). 
Finally, we  like to emphasize that our evidence as to the lack of audit-
quality differentiation in the private client segment of the  Belgian audit market 
is based on  one specific proxy of quality differentiation, namely audit-firm size 
and  its  impact  on  one  specific  dependent  variable,  namely  discretionary 
accruals  management.  Further  tests  of  quality  differentiation  between 
auditors that make  use  of  these  continuous measures  of  audit-firm size but 
test  it  on  alternative  dependent variables,  or  even  use  other  audit  quality 
proxies  are  necessary  to  corroborate  our  findings  and  are  a  worthwhile 
avenue for future research. 
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27 Table 1 Model specification and variable measurement 
Variable  Definition  Model Predictions 
Dependent 
variable 
IDACiti  Absolute value of discretionary accruals for firm i in year t 
calculated using our accruals expectations mode from Chapter 
2 
Test variables 
AUDITORIt  Is one of the following indicator variables, BIG611,  SHAREit, 
NUM~, PARTNERSlt, SUBSIDIAlt, LNTAit or LNOPlt. 
BIG6it  Dummy =1  when the audit firm  of client firm  i in year t is a Big6  -
auditor· 0 otherwise 
SHAREit  The market share of the audit firm of client firm i in year t based  -
on the percentage of assignments in our sample 
NUMlt  Total number of clients of the audit firm of client firm i in year t  -
PARTNERSlt  Total number of partners of the audit firm  -
LNTAlt  Natural logarithm of total assets of the audit firm  of client firm i  -
in year t 
LNOPlt  Natural logarithm of operating profit of the audit firm of client  -
firm i in year t 
Control variables 
FDEBTTAit  Extent to which client firm i in year t depends on  (implicit)  +/-
contracts with creditors measured by the amount of financial 
debt over total assets of client firm i in year t 
DFDEBTit  Dummy = 1 if for client firm i in year t+ 1 financial debt  +/-
increased as com pared to year t  0 otherwise 
CDEBTTAit  Extent to which client firm i in year t depends on implicit  +/-
contracts with suppliers measured by the amount of commercial 
debt over total assets of client firm i in year t 
EMPLlt  Extent to which client firm i depends on implicit contracts with  +/-
employees, proxied by a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the 
client firm  has more than 100 employees, zero otherwise 
TAXit  Dummy=1  if client firm i in year t has no tax-loss carry-forwards  + 
(proxied by whether the firm paid taxes last year, that is in  t-1), 
o  otherwise 
ABOCFit  Operating cash  flow of client firm  i in year t scaled by lagged  ? 
total assets 
28 Table 2 Descriptive statistics on the variables of our explanatory model" 
Panel A: Test variables - Audit firm characteristics (per audit firm) 
Variable  N  Mean  SI.Oev.  Min.  Q1  Median  Q3  Max 
SHARE 
1994  107  0.0097  0.0174  0.0017  0.0017  0.0034  0.0085  0.1025 
1995  133  0.0068  0.0144  0.0012  0.0012  0.0024  0.0062  0.1025 
1996  120  0.0074  0.0152  0.0012  0.0014  0.0028  0.007  0.0987 
NUMc 
1994  106"  123.6604  257.0284  1  13  34.5  93  1263 
1995  132"  89.1288  216.0632  1  11.5  28  59.5  1307 
1996  1190  67.1596  161.6235  1  6  18  43  957 
PARTNERS 
1995  146  2.5734  4.9488  1  1  1  3  49 
AUTA 
1994  77"  87506.53  211557.1  1258  6754  16083  31404  937689 
1995  94"  49869.02  139203.9  1839  6267  12455.5  22541  844615 
1996  91"  53468.96  148089  1721  6768  12237  26574  901656 
AUOP 
1994  77"  8240.94  26267.2  -926  452  1624  4026  203929 
1995  94  5054.96  18121.6  -1912  462  1217.5  2977  160183 
1996  91  5764.67  18385.4  -2460  286  1343  2619  130894 
29 Panel B: Dependent variable and control variables (across firm-year observations) 
Variable  N  Mean  51.Dev.  Min.  Q1  Median  Q3  Max 
IDACI  1302  0.0496  0.0553  0.00002  0.0142565  0.0319518  0.066678  0.57126 
BIGS  1302  0.3725  0.4637  0  0  0  1  1 
SHARE  1302  0.0339  0.0356  0.0012  0.0049  0.0148  0.0606  0.1025 
NUM  1299  429.0238  470.2442  0  38  126  933  1307 
PARTNERS  1296  9.8643  12.0444  1  2  5  14  49 
LNTA  1156"  11.3043  1.6363  7.1373  9.7923  10.9188  13.3408  13.7512 
AUTA  1156"  283404  335447.5  1258  17895  55205  622062  937689 
LNOP  1117"  6.8725  2.1266  2.1972  7.3258  8.4027  10.7622  12.2255 
AUOP  1117"  35592  53764.11  9  1519  4459  47204  203929 
FDEBTTA  1302  0.1732  0.1916  0  0.0010  0.1025  0.3060  0.9203 
DFDEBT  1302  0.4646  0.5  0  0  0  1  1 
CDEBTTA  1302  0.2827  0.2055  0  0.1327  0.2424  0.3611  0.9682 
EMPL  1302  0.2796  0.4490  0  0  0  1  1 
TAX  1302  0.7135  0.4523  0  0  1  1  1 
ABOCF  1302  0.1446  0.1545  0.0001  0.0476  0.0976  0.1902  2.06 
.  .. 
For variable definitions see Table 1, AUTA = total assets of the audit firm  In thousands of 
Belgian francs; AUOP =  operating profit of the audit firm in thousands of Belgian francs. 
b Number of observations reduced due to some missing values for the particular variable. Missing values 
for AUTA and AUOP due to the fact that sole practitioners do not submit financial statements with the 
Belgian National Bank. 
e Data based on all firms that submitted financial statements with the Belgian National Bank.  Note that 
the number of assignments per auditors is generally lower for 1996. This is likely due to the fact that not 
all firms already submitted their financial statements with the National Bank at the date the 1996 CD-
Rom was made. The figures give though an indication of the ranking of the major audit firms,  under the 
assumption that the firms that submit their financial statements later than the the moment at which the 
CD-Rom was made, are randomly distributed across audit firms. 
30 Table 3 Pearson correlation coefficients between the alternative measures of 
audit firm size 
BIGb  SHARE  NUM  PARTNERS  LNTA  LNOP 
BIG6  1 
SHARE  uo~66g~ 
1 
NUM  Uo~666~  Uo:66~i 
l 
PARTNERS  Uo~6~bi  °o~g~6i  °o~6~6i 
1 
LNTA  °o~g66~  °o~gggi  °o~6bgi  uo~g6~i 
J. 
LNOP  Uo~6~6i  uo~g65i  °o~656~  uo~6ggi  Uo~666i 
1 
31 Table 4 Market shares for the seven largest audit firms across the years 1994,1995 
and 19968 
1994  1995  1996 
Audit firm  Market share  Audit firm  Market share  Audit firm  Market share 
%  % 
Ernst & Young  10.25  Ernst & Young  10.25  Ernst & Young 
KPMG  9.40  KPMG  8.88  KPMG 
Coopers & Lybrand  6.32  Coopers & Lybrand  6.05  Deloitte & Touche 
Boeye Geddes  5.29  Deloitle & Touche  5.55  Boeye Geddes 
Van Gulck  Van Gulck 
Deloitte & Touche  4.44  Boeye Geddes  5.31  Coopers & Lybrand 
Van Gulck 
Arthur Andersen  3.07  Price Waterhouse  3.33  Price Waterhouse 
Price Waterhouse  2.56"  Arthur Andersen  2.59"  Arthur Andersen 
Market shares were computed as the number of clients In our sample for audit firm lover the total 
number of clients in our sample. 









Table 5 Ranking of largest audit firms based on the total number of assignments8 
1994  1995  1996 
Audit firm  Number of  Audit firm  Number of  Audit firm  Number of 
assignments  assignments  assignments 
Ernst & Young  1263  Ernst & Young  1307  Ernst & Young 
KPMG  1192  KPMG  1303  KPMG 
Coopers and &  1016  Coopers & Lybrand  1088  Deloitte & Touche 
Deloitte & Touche  934  Deloitte & Touche  1023  Coopers & Lybrand 
Boeye Geddes  612  Boeye Geddes  652  Arthur Andersen 
Van Gulck  Van Gulck 
Arthur Andersen  571  Arthur Andersen  607  Boeye Geddes 
Van Gulck 
Price Waterhouse  4700  Price Waterhouse  495c  Price Waterhouse 
Data based on all firms that submitted financial statements with the Belgian National Bank. Note 
that the number of assignments per auditors is generally lower for 1996. This is likely due to the 
fact that not all firms already submitted their financial statements with the National Bank at the date 
the 1996 CD-Rom was made. The figures give though an indication of the ranking of the major 
audit firms, under the assumption that the firms that submit their financial statements later than the 
the moment at which the CD-Rom was made, are randomly distributed across audit firms. Note as 
well that the top 7 of the largest audit firms is consistent across years. 
bThe next largest auditor is  Delvaux, Fronville, Hoste with 218 assignments. 
cThe next largest auditor is BOO with 248 assignments. 








3730 Table 6 Ranking of audit firms based on the number of partners of the 
audit firm for the year 1995 
Audit firm  Number of partners 
Deloitte & Touche  49 
KPMG  45 
Ernst & Young  27 
Coopers & Lybrand  15 
Bosye Geddes Van Gulck  14 
Price Waterhouse  12 
BDO Bedrijfsrevisoren  10 
Peeters, Dupont & Partners  8 
Arthur Andersen  8 
Hermant, Dodemont & Co  7 
Toelen, Cats Morlie & Co  7 
Table 7 Ranking of largest audit firms based on total assets of the audit 
firm 
1994  1995  1996 
Ernst & Young  Coopers & Lybrand  Coopers & Lybrand 
Coopers & Lybrand  Ernst & Young  Ernst & Young 
KPMG  KPMG  KPMG 
Price Waterhouse  Price Waterhouse  Deloitte & Touche 
Arthur Andersen  Deloitte & Touche  Arthur Andersen 
Deloitte & Touche  Arthur Andersen  Price Waterhouse 
Delvaux Fronville Hoste  Delvaux  Fronville Servais and Delvaux  Fronville Servais and 
Co  Co 
Table 8 Ranking of largest audit firms based on operating profit of the 
audit firm 
1994  1995  1996 
Ernst & Young  Ernst & Young  Ernst & Young 
KPMG  KPMG  KPMG 
Coopers & Lybrand  Coopers & Lybrand  Coopers & Lybrand 
Deloitte & Touche  Deloitte & Touche  Deloitte & Touche 
Arthur Andersen  Van Geet Derick and Co  Arthur Andersen 
Delvaux Fronville en Hoste  Arthur Andersen  Van Geet Derick and Co 
Peeters Dupont and Partners·  Peeters Dupont and Partners  Price Waterhouse 
•  Price Waterhouse is number 8 
33 34 Table 9 Results of the OLS estimation of the absolute value of discretionary accruals 
on proxies of audit firms size and control variables 
Variable"  Model A  Model B  Model C  Model D  Model E  Model F 
BIG6  SHARE  NUM  PARTNERS  LNTA  LNOP 
Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient 
estimateb  estimateb  estimateb  estimateb  estimateb  estimateb 
Intercept  0.05357'"  0.05501 **'  0.05420'"  0.05385'"  0.03692'"  0.04676"* 
AUDITOR  0.00384  -0.01216  0.0000015  0.00007  0.00140  0.000803 
FDEBTTA  -0.01297  -0.01229  -0.01276  -0.01271  -0.01223  -0.01413 
DFDEBT  -0.00569'  -0.00529'  -0.00567*  -0.00582'  -0.00493  -0.00505 
CDEBTIA  -0.01093  -0.01013  -0.01065  -0.01026  -0.00907  -0.00882 
EMPL  0.00115  0.00124  0.00133  0.00132  0.00242  0.00249 
TAX  -0.01408'"  -0.01419'*'  -0.01426'"  -0.01398'"  -0.01323'"  -0.01838*** 
ABOCF  0.08773***  0.08864'**  0.08793**'  0.08917*"  0.08825***  0.08858*" 
F-value  15.81  15.59  15.58  15.72  14.45  13.87 
P-value of F- 0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001 
value 
Adjusted R'  0.0738  0.0728  0.0729  0.0736  0.0754  0.0747 
N  1302  1302  1299  1296  1156  1117" 
. .. 
For variable definitIOns see Table 1  . 
b.,. significant at the 0.01  level;"  significant at the 0.05 level; , significant at the 0.10 level, results are based on two-
tailed tests. 
C  Number of observations reduced due to misSing values for this audit firm characteristic or negative operating profit (in 
Model F). 
35 Table 10 Pearson correlation coefficients between the various proxies of audit firm size and the control variables. 
BIG6  SHARE  NUM  PARTNERS  LNTA  LNOP  FDEBITA  DFDEBT  COEBITA  EMPL  TAX  ABOCF 
BIG6  1 
SHARE  uo~g~g~  1 
NUM 
46~666~  U6~66bi 
1 
PARTNERS  °o~6g6i  °o~gg6i 
O. 6~~~1  1 
0.0001 
LNTA  °o~g6~~  °o~gggi  °o~66g1  °o~g~M 
1 
LNOP  u6~5g&I  U6~66M  U6~&56~  u6~6ggi  U6~6b6i 
1-
FDEBITA  Uci~i~~6  Uci~~~~;  Uci~~~~~  °ci~~~~~ 
U.O~~13  -Uci~~~~~ 
1 
0.7824 
DFDEBT  -Uo~i:~~  -uci~6g~~  uci~gg~  Uci~%~~  -uci~g~~~  -Uci~6H~  Uci~&gg~ 
1 
CDEBITA  Uci~6~n  uci~gi;~  Uci~6~6~  uci~~g~  uci~6g~~  °ci~gji~  -Uci~66M  -Uci~~~~~ 
1 
EMPL  Uo~H~~  Uo~H~~  Uo~HH  -Uo~~~H  Uci~~~~~  Uo~~§H  Uci~t~80  -Uci~~~~~  -°ci~6~~~ 
1 
TAX  -uci~H~g  -Uci~~~~~  -Uci~~~~~  o~ci~~j~  -°ci~~~~~  -°ci~i%i  -°ci~~6~i  -oo~i~g  °o~~~~~  °o~g~~~ 
1 
ABOCF  Uci~6~H  °ci~6igg  °ci~g~~~  °ci~~~~~  uci~gg~~  uci~g~~i  -uci~g~~~  -Uci~~~~~  Uci~~~~~  Uci~iHi  uci~g~M 
1-
- --
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